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ABSTRACT As the world moves towards being increasingly dependent on computers and automation,
building secure applications, systems and networks are some of the main challenges faced in the current
decade. The number of threats that individuals and businesses face is rising exponentially due to the
increasing complexity of networks and services of modern networks. To alleviate the impact of these threats,
researchers have proposed numerous solutions for anomaly detection; however, current tools often fail
to adapt to ever-changing architectures, associated threats and zero-day attacks. This manuscript aims to
pinpoint research gaps and shortcomings of current datasets, their impact on building Network Intrusion
Detection Systems (NIDS) and the growing number of sophisticated threats. To this end, this manuscript
provides researchers with two key pieces of information; a survey of prominent datasets, analyzing their use
and impact on the development of the past decade’s Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and a taxonomy of
network threats and associated tools to carry out these attacks. The manuscript highlights that current IDS
research covers only 33.3% of our threat taxonomy. Current datasets demonstrate a clear lack of real-network
threats, attack representation and include a large number of deprecated threats, which together limit the
detection accuracy of current machine learning IDS approaches. The unique combination of the taxonomy
and the analysis of the datasets provided in this manuscript aims to improve the creation of datasets and the
collection of real-world data. As a result, this will improve the efficiency of the next generation IDS and
reflect network threats more accurately within new datasets.
INDEX TERMS Anomaly detection, datasets, intrusion detection systems, network attacks, network
security, security threats, survey, taxonomy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The world is becoming more dependent on connected
devices, actuators and sensors, regulating the lives of millions
of people. Furthermore, sensor data is expected to increase by
around 13%, reaching 35% of overall data communication
in 2020, reaching a peak of 50 billion connected devices and
an increased monthly Internet traffic volume reaching 30 GB
on average per capita compared to around 10 GB in 2016 [1].
While each device in an Internet of Things (IoT) system
exchanges data, associated services often provide interfaces
to interact with the collected data, often increasing the attack
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surface. Therefore, it is crucial to build robust tools to defend
networks against security threats in modern IoT networks.
Current detection tools are often based on outdated datasets
that do not reflect the reality of recent/modern network
attacks, rendering Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) ineffec-
tive against new threats and zero-days. To the best knowledge
of the authors, there are currently no manuscripts that ana-
lyze the shortcomings of available networking datasets, nor
provide a taxonomy of the current network threats and the
associated tools used to carry out these attacks.
The contributions of this research are threefold:
• An evaluation of the limitations of the available
network-based datasets and their impact on the devel-
opment of IDSs
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• A review of the last decade’s research on NIDS
• A Threat taxonomy is presented, and categorized by:
– The Threat Sources
– The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Layer
– Active or Passive modes
The evaluation of current network-based datasets provides
researchers with an insight of the shortcomings of the datasets
presented when used for training against real-world threats.
A threat taxonomy is derived from the datasets and current
real-world networking threats. This taxonomy serves two
purposes— firstly, it strengthens our argument on the short-
comings of currently available datasets, but most importantly,
it provides researchers with the ability to identify threats
and tools underrepresented in currently available datasets.
To facilitate this endeavor, we further map the current threats
with their associated tools, which in turn can be used by
research to create new datasets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; Section II
depicts the main differences between IDSs, the metrics to
consider for their evaluation and the role of feature selection
in building IDSs. Section III reviews IDSs of the past decade
and their individual contributions are assessed. This section
also evaluates the drawbacks and limitations of the available
datasets. Section IV provides the threat taxonomy. Section V
summarizes the challenges presented in this work and pro-
vides recommendations. Finally, the paper is concluded
in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
A. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS
IDSs are defined as systems built to monitor and analyze
network traffic and/or systems to detect anomalies, intru-
sions or privacy violations. When an intrusion is detected,
an IDS is expected to (a) log the information related to
the intrusion, (b) trigger alerts and (c) take mitigation and
corrective actions [2].
IDS can either be Host Intrusion Detection System (HIDS)
or Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS). HIDS is
responsible for monitoring a system internally, having access
to log files, users’ activities, etc. While NIDS analyses
incoming and outgoing communication between network
nodes.
IDSs differ based on their detection method. Signature-
based IDSs were the first to be developed. Accurate sig-
natures are built from prior detected attacks. The main
advantage of this method is the high accuracy of detecting
known attacks. Signature-based IDS is, however, unable to
detect zero-days, metamorphic and polymorphic threats [3].
The second method, Anomaly-based detection, depends on
identifying patterns and comparing them to normal traffic pat-
terns. This method requires the system to be trained prior to
deployment. The accuracy of anomaly-based systems against
zero-days, metamorphic and polymorphic threats is better
when compared to signature-based IDS. However, the false
positive rate of anomaly-based detection is often higher. It is
important tomention that benign/normal traffic patterns alone
are not sufficient to detect attacks. For this reason, the features
used to represent network traffic play an essential role in
traffic representation.
Intrusion detection (both signature-based and anomaly-
based) can be done on a stateless (per packet) or state-
ful (per flow) basis. Most recent IDSs are stateful, as the
flow provides ‘‘context’’, while packet analysis (stateless)
does not provide this context. It is the responsibility of the
researcher to decide which method is best suited for their
application.
Anomaly-based IDS can be classified into subcategories
based on the training method used. These categories are
statistical, knowledge-based and Machine Learning (ML)
based. Statistical includes univariate, multivariate and time
series. Knowledge-based uses finite state machines and rules
like case-based, N-based, expert systems and descriptor lan-
guages. Buczak and Guven [4] provide recommendations
on choosing the ML/Deep Learning (DL) algorithms based
on the problem intended to be solved. Algorithms include
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), clustering, Genetic Algo-
rithms (GA), etc. Specification-based combines the strength
of both signature and anomaly based to form a hybrid model.
Owezarski et al. [5] summarize the approaches to validate
networking models, which applies to IDS, into four cate-
gories; mathematical models, simulation, emulation and real
experiments. Each of these approaches has their own pros and
cons as discussed by Behal and Kumar [6].
1) METRICS FOR IDS EVALUATION
In order for an IDS to be considered effective, high detection
rate and low false positive rate are key aspects to consider.
Multiple metrics could be used for an IDS evaluation. These
metrics are discussed subsequently showing the significance
and purpose of each. It is important to mention that depending
only on detection rate as the only evaluation metric doesn’t
reflect an IDS performance.
Other important evaluation factors including the
transparency and safety of the overall system, memory
requirements, power consumption and throughput should
be considered. Moreover, [7] adds to the aforementioned
requirements, ease of use, interoperability, transparency and
collaboration.
IDS accuracy can be defined in terms of:
• True Positive (TP): Number of intrusions correctly
detected
• True Negative (TN): Number of non-intrusions correctly
detected
• False Positive (FP): Number of non-intrusions incor-
rectly detected
• False Negative (FN): Number of intrusions incorrectly
detected
Hodo et al. [8], Buse et al. [9] and Aminanto et al. [10]
discuss the main metrics to consider for evaluation in their
respective work. These include the overall accuracy, decision
rates, precision, recall, F1 and Mcc.
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Equation 1 provides the overall accuracy. It returns the
probability that an item is correctly classified by the IDS.
OverallAccuracy = TP+ TN
TP+ TN + FP+ FN (1)
Equation 2 calculates the Sensitivity, Specificity, Fallout, and
Miss Rate detection rates, respectively. Stefan Axelsson [7]
stresses the fact that false positive rates (false alarms) highly
limit the performance of an IDS due to the ‘‘Base-rate fallacy
problem’’.
Detection Rates:
Sensitivity(aka Recall, True Positive Rate) = TP
TP+ FN
Specificity
(aka Selectivity, True Negative Rate) = TN
TN + FP
Fallout(aka False Positive Rate) = FP
TN + FP
Miss Rate(aka False Negative Rate) = FN
TP+ FN
(2)
Equation 3 provides the percentage of positively classified
incidents that are truly positive.
Precision = TP
TP+ FP (3)
To visualize the performance of an IDS, i.e. the trade-off
between sensitivity (true positive rate) and fallout (true neg-
ative rate), AUC (Area Under The Curve) ROC (Receiver
Operating Characteristics) also known as Area Under
the Receiver Operating Characteristics (AUROC) curve is
used [11]–[13]
Equation 4 represents the harmonic mean of precision and
recall. F1 is better suited to represent the performance of an
IDS, specially when dealing with imbalanced classes.
F1 = 2TP
2TP+ FP+ FN (4)
Equation 5 provides Matthews correlation coefficient. It can
only be used in binary IDS in which incidents are classified
as either attack or normal.
Mcc = (TP ∗ TN )− (FP ∗ FN )√
(TP+ FP)(TP+ FN )(TN + FP)(TN+FN ) (5)
Equation 6 addresses the problem of calculating accuracy
in imbalanced datasets. Numerous datasets have a limited
number of attacks’ data compared to benign traffic, hence,
the geometric mean of accuracy provides a more precise
metric than overall accuracymeasure [14]. Space-Time aware
evaluation is introduced by Feargus Pendlebury et al. [15]
to overcome both spatial and temporal biases. The authors
introduced three constraints to be considered when splitting
datasets.
gAcc = √a+ve.a−ve
= √Sensitivity(TPR).Specificity(TNR) (6)
Additionally, CPU consumption, throughput and power con-
sumption are important metrics for evaluating IDSs. Specif-
ically, these metrics are important for IDSs running on dif-
ferent hardware or with specific settings such as high-speed
networks, or on hardware with limited resources.
2) FEATURE SELECTION AND IDS
‘‘Feature Learning’’ [10] or ‘‘Feature Engineering’’
[16] plays an essential role in building any IDS in a way that
chosen features highly affect the IDS performance. Features
are obtained using one of three processes; construction,
extraction and selection. Selection involves filter, wrapper
and embedded techniques [17]. A classification of the fea-
tures used in recent datasets is provided in [4].
Different features representations (i.e. abstractions) are
used to address different areas of threat detection. Some
of them could be considered naïve when they contain
basic network information. Others are considered rich
when they represent deeper details [16]. As highlighted by
Rezaei and Liu [18], there are four main categories of net-
working features; time series, header, payload and statistical.
Unlike header and payload features, time series and statis-
tical ones are available for both encrypted and unencrypted
traffic. The authors further discuss the shortcomings of cur-
rent encrypted traffic classification research. Packet-based
and flow-based features have been used for intrusion detec-
tion purposes. However, with the advancement of network
encryption, packet-based features are rendered impractical
for complex communication networks.
B. RELATED WORK
In the past decade, numerous IDSs were developed and
evaluated against a range of published available datasets.
Diverse review and comparative studies have been published
tackling the design of IDS for various applications, as well as,
the machine learning techniques used to build IDS, however,
the dataset challenges are not discussed.
Current Network IDS surveys often focus on a single
aspect of IDS evaluation. Buczak and Guven [4] focus on
the different ML and DL algorithms used to build IDS. They
explain the different algorithms, mention their time complex-
ity and list notable papers that employ each algorithm to IDS.
Hodo et al. [8] extend the ML discussion, the authors focus
on the role that feature selection plays in the overall training
and performance evaluation of ML techniques. An extensive
discussion of features and how they impact the design and
accuracy of IDS is plotted by Varma et al. [19]. IDS char-
acteristics are discussed by Debar et al. [20], as well as,
Amer and Hamilton [21].
Hamed et al. [22] presents an overview of IDS compo-
nents, listing them as (a) pre-processing/feature extraction,
(b) pattern analyzer, which involves knowledge representa-
tion and learning processes, and finally (c) decision making.
They briefly discuss the benefits of each learning technique.
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Additional IDS aspects are considered, for example,
Amit et al. [23] list the various problems and challenges
involved with using ML in building IDSs.
The aforementioned manuscripts are further analyzed
within Section III.
Other perspectives included in recent studies focus
on a single network architecture. For example, Ismail
Butun et al. [2] discusses Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN),
Zhou et al. [24] highlights IDS in industrial process automa-
tion while Ghaffarian and Shahriari [16] study ML and Data
Mining (DM) techniques for software vulnerability.
While these surveys provide valuable information on the
design and the accuracy, none provide a detailed overview
of the shortcomings of available datasets nor do they pro-
vide information on tools used to carry out attacks. In this
manuscript, we address these shortcomings and provide
detailed complementary work to build datasets that reflect
current network threats. This manuscript is complementary
to prior surveys by highlighting the shortcomings of current
datasets and the claims of numerous studies on their abilities
to detect deprecated attacks.
III. IDS AND DATASETS SURVEY
In this section, prominent datasets are summarized, and their
limitations are highlighted. Furthermore, recent IDSs are ana-
lyzed, discussing the algorithms used and the datasets the
IDSs were evaluated against. Moreover, trends observed in
the algorithms used by research over the past decade are
discussed, highlighting a clear shift in the use of specific
algorithms.
A. DATASETS
Researchers depended on benchmark datasets to evaluate
their results. However, currently available datasets lack
real-life characteristics of recent network traffic. This is the
reason that made most of the anomaly IDSs not applicable
for production environments [25]. Furthermore, IDS is unable
to adapt to constant changes in networks (i.e. new nodes,
changing traffic loads, changing topology, etc.). Networks are
constantly changing, for this reason depending solely on old
datasets doesn’t help the advancement of IDS. The process of
generating new datasets should consider this constant change
fact. For example, proposing a standard dataset generation
platform with extendable functionality, would remove the
burden of generating datasets from scratch and cope with
concept drift in network patterns. This recommendation and
others are further discussed in Section V.
Datasets could either be real (i.e. recorded from a net-
work set-up) or synthetic (i.e. simulated or injected traffic).
Synthetic attack injection could be used to either introduce
attacks to an existing dataset or balance the attack classes
present in a dataset. Viegas et al. [25] mentioned that for a
dataset to be considered, it has to cover the following prop-
erties. (a) Real network traffic (similar to production ones),
(b) valid, such that it has complete scenarios. (c) Labeled,
classifying each record as normal or attack, (d) variant,
(e) correct, (f) can be updated easily. (g) Reproducible in
order to give researchers space to compare across different
datasets, and finally, (h) shareable, hence it should not contain
any confidential data. Additionally, Sharafaldin et al. [56]
mentions that (i) having an appropriate documentation for
the feature and dataset collection environment is an important
aspect of IDS dataset. Cordero et al. [57] adds (j) having high
quality normal and (k) excluding any disturbance or defects
as further requirements for evaluation datasets. Furthermore,
for NIDS evaluation dataset, functional and non-functional
requirements are elaborated in [58].
In this manuscript, we also identify two problems that
impact research domains using datasets, whether they are
synthetic or not. i) Sharing datasets is sometimes prohibited
due to the data contained, hence, the research in the area
is limited. ii) Simulating real-life scenarios and associated
attacks is difficult due to the number of parameters required
for the model to be viable. However, this manuscript provides
a list of the most used and recent datasets.
TABLE 1 summarizes the available datasets and catego-
rizes them based on the domain they belong to. Moreover,
attacks found in each are presented. Extra remarks, including
the publication year, institute and attack classes details are
listed in TABLE 3. These datasets cover mobile applica-
tions, Virtual Private Networks (VPN), Tor Networks, IDS,
Botnet, Network Flows and IoT. Some of the mentioned
datasets are presented in [56]. The evaluation includes DEF-
CON [59], CAIDA [60], LBNL [61], CDX [62], Kyoto [63],
Twente [64], UMASS [65] and ADFA [30].
Ring et al. [66] comprehensively overview of NIDS
datasets covering their main features, data format, anonymity,
size, availability, recording environment, balancing, etc. . .The
authors list the datasets and their corresponding values in
each of the aforementioned criteria, leaving the choice for
researchers to make based on their use-case and scenario.
On the contrary, Gharib et al. [67] propose datasets score
based on the attacks’ coverage, protocols’ coverage, metadata
availability, anonymity, heterogeneity and labeling.While the
authors evaluate attacks in the datasets and present a scientific
comparison, the authors fail to provide a detailed analysis of
the broader impact of their analysis.
Furthermore, due to the sparsity of the details supple-
menting the available datasets, the task of evaluating and
ranking datasets would introduce unfair results. For example,
a dataset that realistically represents background and attack
traffic is better than a dataset that doesn’t. However, there is
no standard metric to evaluate how realistic the generation is,
as well as, this information is not released with the dataset.
B. IDS AND ASSOCIATED DATASETS ANALYSIS
In this section, a survey of recent ML IDS is provided,
analyzing the associated datasets, and their shortcomings.
IEEE Xplore and Google Scholar queries were made using
‘‘Intrusion Detection System*’’ OR ‘‘IDS*’’ filtering the
dates to include manuscripts published in the last decade.
The filtration was made to have a wide coverage of datasets,
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TABLE 1. Attacks prominent datasets.
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FIGURE 1. Datasets used for IDS evaluation distribution (85 IDSs
manuscripts listed in Table 2).
ML techniques and detected attacks. A total of 85 published
manuscripts in the period of [2008 − 2020] are analyzed.
Analysis of older IDS ML techniques and used features for
the period 2004 - 2007 was previously conducted by Nguyen
and Armitage [11]. They discuss the limitations of port-based
and payload-based classification and the emerging use of
ML techniques to classify IP traffic.
TABLE 2 summarizes the pre-eminent (i.e., most cited)
IDS research from the past decade. Each IDS is mentioned
with a list of the algorithms used and the datasets that the
IDS was evaluated against. Moreover, the attacks detected
are also listed. The algorithmic trends are then discussed
alongside the attacks included in the datasets used.
FIGURE 1 shows the distribution of datasets used for
research in the last decade. Only 11% of the mentioned IDSs
used generated or simulated datasets. It is also clear through
this analysis that most datasets lack real-life properties, which
were previously mentioned in Section III-A. FIGURE 1 also
highlights the use of KDD-99 as the dataset of choice. Amjad
Al Tobi and Ishbel Duncan [68] provide a comprehensive
analysis of the drawbacks of the KDD’99 dataset. Moreover,
Siddique et al. [69] provide a timeline for KDD datasets
family. The provided timeline show both the different crit-
icism points and the UCI Lab warning not to use KDD
Cup’99 dataset, which further emphasizes the drawbacks of
using KDD Cup’99 in the current IDS research. The second
most used dataset is the DARPA datasets. DARPA datasets
fail to accurately represent current attacks due to their age.
Moreover, the use of the KDD’99 and DARPA datasets
lead to an endemic situation, numerous results reported in
literature claim detection results which are not applicable
in real-world scenarios. The shortcomings of the DARPA
dataset are analyzed by M. Mahoney and P. Chan [70] and
JohnMcHugh [71]. Alongside the limitations of each dataset,
they are also deprecated, hence, demonstrating the inability of
the IDSs presented in TABLE 2 to cope with the most recent
attacks and threats.
FIGURE 2. Covered attacks in discussed IDS (85 IDSs manuscripts listed
in Table 2).
FIGURE 2 visualizes the attacks detected by the differ-
ent IDSs presented in TABLE 2. It is shown that the four
attacks available in the KDD-99 dataset are the most cov-
ered, namely; DoS/DDoS, Probing, R2L, U2R. Moreover,
only 12 attacks are listed in FIGURE 2 which highlights
potential limitations of these IDS to copewith the broad range
of attacks and zero-day attacks. To tackle the detection of
zero-day attacks, there is a need to build extendable datasets
that could be used to train machine learning models used for
anomaly detection. By employing extendable datasets and
a standardized method for dataset generation, alongside the
advancement in ML [72], [73], zero-day detection could be
integrated into anomaly-based IDSs. Later in Section IV, our
presented threat taxonomy highlights the percentage of attack
coverage achieved by current IDSs.
To further analyze the last decade research on IDSs, it is
important to consider the algorithms used. Anomaly-based
IDSs are based on identifying patterns that define nor-
mal and abnormal traffic. These IDSs can be classified
into subcategories based on the training method used as
aforementioned in Section II. These categories are iden-
tified respectively as statistical, knowledge-based and ML
based. Statistical includes univariate, multivariate and time
series. Knowledge-based uses finite state machines and rules
like case-based, n-based, expert systems and descriptor lan-
guages. ML algorithms include artificial neural networks,
clustering, genetic algorithms, Deep Learning (DL), etc.
FIGURE 3 (a) highlights the dominance of ML algorithms
employed when building an IDS. As shown, both statistical
and knowledge-based algorithms are less represented. This
dominance is due to the significant use of ML techniques
in various research domains. FIGURE 3 (a) is organized by
categories (Inner Circle), subcategories (Centre Circle) and
finally, the percentage of the IDSs presented in TABLE 2
using these algorithms (Outer Circle). FIGURE 3 (b) on the
other hand, provides a visualization of the distribution of the
algorithms used by the IDSs presented in TABLE 2. The
dominance ofANN, SVMand k-means as themost used algo-
rithms is reasoned by their ability to discriminate between
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FIGURE 3. Algorithms usage distribution in the discussed IDS (85 IDSs
manuscripts listed in Table 2)
Such that: AdaBoost: Adaptive Boosting
AIS: Artificial Immune System ANN: Artificial Neural Network
CNN: Convolutional Neural Network CUSUM: Cumulative Sum
FSM: Finite State Machine GA: Genetic Algorithms
k-NN: k-Nearest Neighbors ML: Machine Learning
PCA: Principal Component Analysis PSO: Particle Swarm Optimization
RNN: Recurrent Neural Network SOM: Self-Organizing Map
SVM: Support Vector Machine.
benign and attack classes given a feature set. However, it is
important to mention that leveraging newML techniques and
adapting ones from other domains will advance the develop-
ment of the next decade’s IDSs.
IV. THREATS TAXONOMY
Building a generic and modular taxonomy for security threats
is of high importance in order to help researchers and
cyber-security practitioners build tools capable of detecting
various attacks ranging from known to zero-day attacks.
Kendall et al. [74] proposes one of the earliest classifi-
cations of intrusions [25]. Kendall classifies intrusions into
four categories namely: Denial of Service (DoS), Remote
to Local (R2L), User to Root (U2R) and Probing. In DoS,
the attacker tends to prevent users from accessing a given
service. When the attacker tried to gain authorized access to
the target system, either by gaining local access or promoting
the user to a root user, these attackswere classified as R2L and
U2R respectively. Finally, probing was defined as an attacker
actively footprinting a system for vulnerabilities.
Donald Welch classifies common threats in wireless
networks into seven attack techniques (Traffic Analysis,
Passive Eavesdropping, Active Eavesdropping, Unautho-
rized Access, Man-in-the-middle, Session Hijacking and
Replay) [75]. In a paper by Sachin Babar et al. [76],
the problem is addressed from a different perspective. Threats
are classified according to the Internet of things secu-
rity requirements (identification, communication, physical
threat, embedded security and storage management). Spe-
cific domain taxonomies have also grabbed the attention of
researchers. David Kotz [77] discusses privacy threats in
the mobile health (mHealth) domain. In the same manner,
Keshnee Padayachee [78], shows the security threats target-
ing compliant information and Monjur Ahmed and Alan T.
Litchfield [79] works on threats from a cloud computing point
of view.
This section classifies network threats based on the layers
of the OSI model, provides examples of attacks for different
threat types and presents a taxonomy associating network
threats and the tools used to carry out attacks. The tax-
onomies aim at helping researchers building IDSs, but more
importantly by associating the threats to the OSI model and
benchmarking the threats to the tools used to carry attack or
take advantage of specific vulnerabilities, the taxonomies aim
to achieve higher accuracies and reduce the number of false
positives of current IDS [80] and build better datasets.
A. THREAT SOURCES
FIGURE 4 identifies network threats and provides a classi-
fication according to the following criteria; (I) source of the
threat, (II) affected layer based on Open Systems Intercon-
nection (OSI) model and (III) active and passive threats. The
different threats are described hereafter.
As shown, attacks can target a single layer of the OSI
model, but it is important to highlight that other layers may
also be affected. The taxonomy presented in this manuscript
focuses on the main target layer of attack. An attack is also
described to be active if it affects information, performance,
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FIGURE 4. Taxonomy of threats (1 of 3).
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FIGURE 4. (Continued.) Taxonomy of threats (2 of 3).
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FIGURE 4. (Continued.) Taxonomy of threats (3 of 3).
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or any aspect of the media on which it is running. In contrast
to active attacks, during passive attacks the attacker is con-
cerned with either gathering information or monitoring the
network. These can be identified by their shape in FIGURE 4.
Active attacks are represented by a rectangle shape, whilst
passive attacks are represented by an oval shape. Attacks like
adware (FIGURE 4 - 2.1.3), spyware (FIGURE 4 - 2.1.4)
and information gathering (FIGURE 4 - 3.1) are consid-
ered passive attacks. DoS (FIGURE 4 - 1.1), Impersonation
(FIGURE 4 - 1.4) and Virus (FIGURE 4 - 2.1.2) are forms of
active attacks. However, some attacks cannot be considered
active or passive until their usage is known. An example of
this case is SQL-injection, if it is used for querying data from
a database then it is passive. However, if it is used to alter data,
drop tables or relations then the attack can be considered as
active.
1) NETWORK THREATS
Threats are initiated based on a flow of packets sent over
a network. Two of the most common forms of network
threats are Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) (FIGURE 4 - 1.1), where an attacker
floods the network with requests rendering the service unre-
sponsive. During these attacks, legitimate users cannot access
the services. Note that common anomalies known as ‘Flash
Crowds’ are often mistaken with DoS and DDoS attacks [81].
Flash Crowds happen when a high flow of traffic for a certain
service or website occurs. This happens immediately upon
the occurrence of a significant event. For example, breaking
news, sales events, etc. DoS and DDoS can be divided into
four categories including flood attacks (FIGURE 4 - 1.1.1),
amplification attacks (FIGURE 4 - 1.1.2), protocol
exploit (FIGURE 4 - 1.1.3), and malformed packets
(FIGURE 4 - 1.1.4). These are defined respectively through
attack examples. Smurf attacks (FIGURE 4 - 1.1.1.1) depends
on generating a large amount of ping requests. Over-
flows (FIGURE 4 - 1.1.1.2) occurs when a program writes
more bytes than allowed. This occurs when an attacker sends
packets larger than 65536 bytes (allowed in the IP protocol)
and the stack does not have an appropriate input sanitation
in place. The ping of Death (FIGURE 4 - 1.1.4.1) attack
occurs when packets are too large for routers and splitting
is required. The Teardrop (FIGURE 4 - 1.1.3.1) attack takes
place when an incorrect offset is set by the attacker. Finally,
the SYN flood (FIGURE 4 - 1.1.1.3) attack happens when
the host allocates memory for a huge number of TCP SYN
packets.
Packet forging (FIGURE 4 - 1.2) is another form of
networking attack. Packet forging or injection is the action
where the attacker generates packets that look the same as
normal network traffic. These packets can be used to per-
form unauthorized actions and steal sensitive data like: login
credentials, personal data, credit card details, Social Security
Numbers (SSN) numbers, etc. When the attacker passively
monitors or intercepts communications between two or more
entities and starts to control the communication, this attack is
referred to as a ‘Man in the Middle’ attack (FIGURE 4 - 1.3).
Unlike ‘Man in the Middle’ attack, a ‘Man In The Browser’
attack (1.4) intercepts the browser to alter or add fields to a
web page asking the user to enter confidential data. Imper-
sonation (FIGURE 4 - 1.5) or pretending to be another user
can take different forms. The attacker may impersonate a user
to gain higher security level and gain access to unauthorized
data (FIGURE 4 - 1.5.1) or use cloning (FIGURE 4 - 1.5.2).
Cloning is a common attack in social networks to imper-
sonate an individual to leverage information. Rogue access
points (FIGURE 4 - 1.5.3) are other impersonation
forms in wireless networks. During an IP spoofing attack
(FIGURE 4 - 1.5.4.1) an attacker spoofs an IP address
and sends packets impersonating a legitimate host. DNS
spoofing - also known as DNS cache poisoning (FIGURE 4
- 1.5.4.2) is another type of spoofing. The attacker redi-
rects packets by poisoning the DNS. Finally, ARP spoofing
(FIGURE 4 - 1.5.4.3) is used to perform attacks like Man
In the Middle, in order to dissociate legitimate IP and MAC
addresses in the ARP tables of victims.
Scanning/enumeration are an essential step for initiating
attacks. During scanning (FIGURE 4 - 1.6), the attacker starts
with searching the network for information such as: active
nodes, running operating systems, software versions, etc.
As defined in [82], scanning has many forms, using protocols
such as TCP (FIGURE 4 - 1.6.1) or UDP (FIGURE 4 - 1.6.2).
The last two examples of network attacks are media access
control (MAC) address flooding (FIGURE 4 - 1.7), and
VLAN hopping attack (FIGURE 4 - 1.8). In MAC flood-
ing (FIGURE 4 - 1.7), the attacker is targeting the network
switches and as a result, packets are redirected to the wrong
physical ports, while the VLANhopping attack has two forms
of either switch spoofing (FIGURE 4 - 1.8.1) or double
tagging (FIGURE 4 - 1.8.2).
2) HOST THREATS
Host attacks target specific hosts or systems by running
malicious software to compromise or corrupt system func-
tionalities. Most host attacks are categorized under the mal-
ware (FIGURE 4 - 2.1) category. This includes worms,
viruses, adware, spyware, Trojans and ransomware. Viruses
are known to affect programs and files when shared with
other users on the network, whilst worms are known to
self-replicate and affect multiple systems. Adware is known
for showing advertisements to users when surfing the Internet
or installing software. Although adware is less likely to run
malicious code, it can compromise the performance of a
system. Spyware gathers information such as documents, user
cookies, browsing history, emails, etc. or monitors and tracks
user actions. Trojans often look like trusted applications, but
allow an attacker to control a device. Furthermore, camou-
flage malware (FIGURE 4 - 2.1.7) evolved over time reach-
ing polymorphic and metamorphic techniques in 1990 and
1998 respectively [83], [84]. For example, self-mutating
malware could use numerous techniques, such as, instruc-
tion substitution or permutation, garbage insertion, variable
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substitutions and control-flow alteration [85]. Last, ran-
somware is a relatively new type ofmalwarewhere the system
is kept under the control of the attacker - or a third entity -
by encrypting files until the user/organization pays
a ransom [86].
3) SOFTWARE THREATS
Code injection (FIGURE 4 - 3.2) can include SQL Injec-
tion to query a database, resulting in obtaining confiden-
tial data, or deleting data by dropping columns, rows or
tables. Cross-site scripting (XSS) is used to run mali-
cious code to steal cookies or credentials. XSS has
three main categories. The first is persistent/stored XSS
(FIGURE 4 - 3.2.2.1), in this case, a script is saved to a
database and is executed every time the page is loaded.
The second is Reflected XSS (FIGURE 4 - 3.2.2.2), where
the script is part of a HTTP request sent to the server. The
last is DOM-based XSS (FIGURE 4 - 3.2.2.3) which can be
considered as an advanced type of XSS. The attacker changes
values in the Document Object Model (DOM) e.g. document
location, document URL, etc. DOM-based XSS is difficult to
detect as the script is never transferred to the server. Drive-
by or download (FIGURE 4-3.6) is another software threat
that requires no action from the user, however, the malicious
code is automatically downloaded. It contributed to 48%
of all web-based attacks in 2017 [87], [88] and is consid-
ered one of the main threats in 2019 [89]. Fingerprinting
(FIGURE 4 - 3.3) and misconfiguration are also forms of
software threats. Fake server certificates (FIGURE 4 - 3.5) are
considered alarming and should be considered while analyz-
ing communications as they could deceive the browser/user
thinking that the connection is secure. This could result in
phishing websites looking legitimate. Moreover, they could
be used as a seed to perform other attacks like Man-in-the-
Middle.
4) PHYSICAL THREATS
Physical attacks are a result of a tempering attempt on the net-
work hardware (edge, or other devices) or its configuration.
This can include changing configurations (FIGURE 4 - 4.2)
and introducing backdoors (i.e. The Evil Maid).
5) HUMAN THREATS
The last category of networking attacks is one based on
human actions. These include user masquerade
(FIGURE 4 - 5.1). Phishing is another form of human attacks
where the attacker uses emails or other electronic messaging
services to obtain credentials or confidential data. When a
user attempts to obtain higher privileges, it is considered a
human attack like User to Root (FIGURE 4 - 5.3) and Remote
to Local R2L (FIGURE 4 - 5.4). Additionally, a user can be
denied an action such as repudiation attack (FIGURE 4 - 5.5).
Human attacks can also include session hijacking or sniffing,
these attacks are based on the attacker gaining access over an
active session to access cookies and tokens.
Based on the taxonomy discussed in FIGURE 4 and the
recent IDSs discussed in Section III-B, it can be seen that
there are many threats that are not addressed by recent IDSs.
FIGURE 5 visualizes all the threats mentioned in the taxon-
omy. The associated percentage represents attacks covered by
the IDSs discussed in TABLE 2. As shown a large number
of attacks (72%) are not covered. Hence, the network threat
taxonomy aims at addressing the following:
• Help researchers generate datasets that cover non-
addressed attacks.
• Provide an up-to-date taxonomy of attacks allowing to
measure threats covered by datasets and the ability of
IDSs to detect these threats
• Provide a structured way to address and represent threats
and attacks.
B. ATTACKING TOOLS
Many tools [82], [90] have been developed to initiate different
attacks. FIGURE 6 shows the main tools classified by the
attacks they are used for. This can be used by researchers
when building an IDS for a specific threat, then the associated
tools are ones of interest. For example, for an IDS classifying
impersonation attacks, Caffe-Latte, Hirte, EvilTwin and Cain
and Abel are tools to check. Yaga and SQL attacks are tools
used for U2R and so on.
V. CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this section, our findings are outlined based on the dis-
cussion in Section III and Section IV. A list of limitations is
reviewed then the recommendations are listed.
A. LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES
The limitations and challenges in datasets used in IDSs can
be summarized in the following:
• Attacks Coverage: As shown in this work only 33.3%
of known attacks are covered in publicly available
datasets reviewed. This is considered one of the biggest
challenges preventing IDSs to be used in real-life envi-
ronments.
• Real-life Simulation: Only 11% of the past decade
IDSs use recent and/or real-life generated or simulated
datasets. This demonstrates a flaw in the development of
IDSs but highlights their limited ability to cope with the
emerging needs.
• Zero-Day Attacks Handling: Attacks evolve at a pace
that datasets are not currently coping with. New dataset
generation techniques are needed. If the process of gen-
erating datasets and making them publicly available is
mademore efficient, IDSmodels can be quickly updated
and re-trained to cope with the changes.
• Special Purpose Datasets: There are a limited number
of available datasets serving special purpose IDSs. For
example, publicly available datasets for IoT, SCADA
and Tor networks are currently insufficient.
• Dataset Outlook: Rapid advances in networking and
associated technologies require a shift in dataset
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FIGURE 5. Distribution of covered attacks in discussed IDS (85 IDSs manuscripts listed
in Table 2).
generation paradigm. Emerging technologies, such as
Blockchain, Software Defined Network (SDN), Net-
work Function Virtualisation (NFV), Big-Data, and their
associated threats are currently not covered within avail-
able datasets. Yielding the dataset generation following
trends in technologies [91]–[93].
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Guided by the critical impact of datasets on the evolvement of
IDSs and the importance of robust and accurate IDS models,
the following recommendations help build the next genera-
tion IDSs. The research direction should focus equally on
building complex models for IDSs and gathering/generating
data that represent benign and attack scenarios accurately.
This will result in IDSs suitable for real-life deployments.
• ML-First Vs Data-First: As discussed in Section III-A,
obtaining valid, representative, and accurate data should
be considered as the primary focus of research for the
creation of IDSs. Building IDSs based on skewed and
biased data only produces models unfit for exploitation,
hence, Data-First models must be considered before
ML-First.
• Using precise evaluation metrics: As discussed in
Section II, metrics - other than accuracy - should be
considered to precisely reflect an IDS performance.
For example, FP and Recall should be reported.
Furthermore, the geometric mean should be used with
imbalanced datasets, as well as, networkingmetrics such
as throughput. Conventional ML models report loss and
accuracy by default unless other parameters are defined.
Relying on the recorded loss and accuracy without mea-
suring proposed evaluation metrics may result in mis-
leading assessments of the overall IDS efficiency.
• Introduce modular and extendable datasets: As
aforementioned, special purpose datasets are demanded,
either to cover bespoke networks and architectures
(e.g. IoT, SCADA, Tor, etc.) or to introduce new and
zero-day attacks. To increase the impact of datasets,
they are required to be easily extendable and capable
of integrating with other datasets. As a result, datasets
would be adaptable to the continuous network changes.
Also, dataset generation could be rendered in the IDS
pipeline, therefore, not requiring the generation of a
new dataset with every introduced change. To this end,
anomaly based IDSs could be trained to use advanced
ML techniques to identify new and zero-day attacks.
• Standardize attack dataset generation/collection
method: One of the main challenges forcing researchers
to work with outdated datasets is the lack of documenta-
tion associated with newly available datasets. Moreover,
publishing raw packet data, not only the computed fea-
tures, is needed to expand the use of datasets. One of the
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FIGURE 6. Attacking tools.
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ways to generate datasets relies on α (using descriptive
language to describe attacks) and β (using behavior
and statistical measures to describe attacks) profiles,
as described by Shiravi et al. [94]. Ring et al. [66]
recommends being careful with anonymization and
choosing which fields to be discarded.
Privacy is depicted as one of the main obstacles against
the collection of new attacks data. Furthermore, the lack
of standard tools for data collection, anonymization,
documentation and publication demand researchers to
use their own tailored methods.
• Introducemodels to inject realistic attacks: Flow-Level
Anomaly Modeling Engine FLAME [95] was one of the
first tools to inject attacks that leave traces into network
flows. ID2T [57], [96], [97] is a proposed flexible model
to inject scenarios to existing datasets.
The absence of thorough documentation of datasets
makes it harder to map one dataset to another, rendering
it impractical to add new attacks to existing datasets.
Moreover, assuming that there exists a standard method
to export realistic traffic, there isn’t enough information
about how to inject newly collected data to existing ones.
Furthermore, the existing traffic injection proposals are
limited to a single usage/prototype.
• Generated dataset resilience: To ensure dataset
resilience, variations of the dataset should be generated.
This could include variation of attack scenarios, differ-
ent attacks, diverse benign traffic load (different time of
day load). This, with other measures, would guarantee
an extended dataset lifetime. Moreover, the complexity
of dataset variation generation should be kept minimal.
It is key for a dataset to be provided in a raw state to allow
researchers to make a choice between using stateless
or stateful analysis. If a dataset is provided only in a
pre-processed form, researchers may lose the ability to
use stateless or stateful detection methods and hinder the
detection and accuracy of their algorithms.
• Leveraging network monitoring to create real
traffic: Since most of the available benchmark datasets
lack real-life properties, new datasets generation should
benefit from network monitoring to generate realistic
background traffic [34]. Furthermore, if real traffic
could not be included in the dataset due to privacy
concerns, real traffic should act as the ground truth for
further traffic generation/simulation. Moreover, for spe-
cial purpose networks, relying on released IoT/Critical
infrastructure network architecture case studies should
act as a guidance for network simulation. This should
reduce the gap in terms of accurate realistic datasets.
Different validation approaches should be used for IDS,
however, with the advancement of IDS research, realistic
experiments should be the main focus as demonstrated
in [6].
• Dataset Validation: Newly generated datasets should
be validated based on network traffic validation tech-
niques. Molnár et al. [98] list the various metrics that
could be used for this purpose. Furthermore, the simi-
larities between real and synthetic traffic should also be
evaluated as proposed in [99], [100].
• Updated Threats Taxonomy: The networking threat
taxonomy presented at this work aims at helping cre-
ate datasets that cover a wider range of attacks. Main-
taining the taxonomy in a timely manner will keep it
an up-to-date reference for future IDSs research. Fur-
thermore, the taxonomy is made available for public
contribution through a GitHub repository to encourage
contributions from other researchers to extend, revise
and update it.
While these recommendations might appear trivial at first,
the majority of recent and old datasets proposed online do
not conform to these guidelines as demonstrated within the
previous sections. Hence, through this section, we provided
recommendations for future datasets to follow ensuring the
creation/generation of usable/accurate datasets.
VI. CONCLUSION
This research aims at tackling the problem of having a
generic taxonomy for network threats. A proposed taxonomy
is presented for categorizing network attacks based on the
source, OSI model layer and whether the threat is active or
passive. The prominent IDS research over the past decade
(2008 - 2020) is analyzed. The analysis results in three main
findings. First, benchmark datasets lack real-world properties
and fail to cope with constant changes in attacks and network
architectures, thus, limiting the performance of IDS. Second,
we present a taxonomy of tools and associated attacks, and
demonstrate that current IDS research only covers around
33.3% of threats presented in the taxonomy. Third, we high-
light that - whilst ML is used by 97.25% of the examined
IDS - ANN, k-means and SVM represent the majority of the
algorithms used. While these algorithms present outstand-
ing results, we also highlight that these results are obtained
on outdated datasets and, therefore, not representative of
real-world architectures and attack scenarios.
Finally, the network threat taxonomy and the attacks
and associated tool taxonomy are open-sourced and avail-
able through GitHub,1 allowing both security and academic
researchers to contribute to the taxonomy and ensure its
relevance in the future.
APPENDIX
In this appendix, Table 2 shows the prominent research over
the past decade (2008 - 2020) used in the analysis presented in
Section III. Each row represents one manuscript, highlighting
the dataset and algorithms used within the research, alongside
the attacks that the IDS is capable of detecting. Table 3 sum-
marizes the publication year and attacks remarks for datasets
discussed in Section III-A.
1https://github.com/AbertayMachineLearningGroup/network-threats-
taxonomy
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TABLE 2. Over a decade of intrusion detection systems (2008 - 2020).
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TABLE 2. (Continued.) Over a decade of intrusion detection systems (2008 - 2020).
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TABLE 3. Datasets attacks remarks.
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